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The privatisation experience
in the Australian banking and insurance
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in ownership structures
Monica Keneley∗ and Margaret McKenzie
School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University
Deregulation has been a feature of the evolution of financial markets in the past two decades. Extending this trend
has been the move to privatise government-owned financial institutions. In the 1990s, Australian governments
progressively sold publicly owned banks and insurance institutions. One outcome has been that few of these
privatised financial firms exist today, having been absorbed in mergers and acquisitions within the financial
services sector. This paper uses an information cost framework to explain the experience of privatised banks and
insurers. Our approach points to a dynamic process of organisational change that has influenced the outcomes of
privatisation in the financial services sector.
Keywords: privatisation; financial markets; banking and insurance; deregulation; information costs;
organisational change
Introduction
Deregulation was a feature of the evolution of financial markets in the 1980s. Australia, like
Britain, followed the global trend of lifting regulatory constraints which had been in place since
the end of World War II. In the decade following, the process was carried further with the pri-
vatisation of government-owned financial institutions. The intent of this policy was to accrue
efficiency gains following the change in ownership structures. International studies of privatisa-
tion in banking suggest that it has been associated with improved performance (Megginson, Nash
and Van Randenborgh 1994; Megginson 2005, 346). Such studies do not usually account for the
environmental context of the institutions being privatised. The approach taken in this paper is to
identify the factors affecting the evolution of the financial services sector and the implications
for ownership structures. An historical approach promotes a deeper understanding of the forces
at work and the resulting outcomes.
Ten years after the major push to privatise government financial institutions, very few still exist.
While privatisation has led to the demise of individual enterprises, it has facilitated structural
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adjustment in the sector as a whole. Privatisation has been an intrinsic part of restructuring the
financial services sector.
This paper proceeds by first locating the privatisation of financial institutions within the context
of general policy towards privatisation in Australia at the time. It then proposes a theoreti-
cal framework for explaining the change in ownership structure and analyses the position of
government-owned institutions within Australian financial markets. The outcome of the sell-off
of government-owned banks and insurance institutions is then explored.
Privatisation policy and the financial services sector in Australia
The consequences of privatisation for Australian banking and insurance institutions cannot be
understood without considering the environment in which the policy was implemented. Privati-
sation is usually taken to mean the sale or transfer of assets of state-owned entities into private
ownership (Domberger and Piggott 1986, 56). It has come to be viewed as an intrinsic element of
policies seeking to liberalise economies. It has been promoted as a source of efficiency gain for
the enterprise, sector and economy at large. An underlying assumption in the sale of government-
owned financial institutions was that they were by nature inefficient. Three key reasons have
been put forward to justify this assumption. First, managers of government-owned institutions
were thought to have weaker incentives than those facing managers of privately-owned firms
and were argued to be less committed to maximising revenues and minimising costs. Second,
government enterprises were not monitored as strictly as private enterprises and there were fewer
effective methods for disciplining managers. Third, government enterprises were thought to be
inefficient because they were accountable to political interests rather than markets (Megginson
2005, 315). On this basis, supporters of privatisation argued that the sale of government institutions
would lead to more efficient outcomes.
In Australia, the rate of privatisation accelerated with the implementation of microeconomic
reform through the 1990s. Privatisation occurred in the context of reforms intended to widen
markets beyond State and national borders. Many state-owned enterprises, including government
banks, were constrained to operate within State borders. One aim of privatisation was to expand
competition beyond State boundaries. This was true nationally, as well, to the extent that public
assets were sold to foreign entities, thereby helping to integrate Australia’s capital markets into
the international economy. This market widening in turn shaped outcomes for privatised financial
institutions.
This paper argues that, given the structural change occurring in the financial services sector,
privatisation was inevitable. Governments found themselves unable to sustain the capital invest-
ment required for state-owned institutions to grow and compete in the emerging financial markets
of the time. The sale of these enterprises helped to resolve this problem.
Measures to deregulate the financial services sector commenced with the Committee of Inquiry
into the Australian Financial System (Campbell 1981).1 The recommendations of the inquiry
presented a justification for sale of state-owned financial institutions. It was argued that these
agencies should be assessed according to the principle of competitive neutrality. That is, their
operation should not be competitively advantaged relative to private institutions. Under competi-
tive neutrality, markets work most efficiently if participants have an equal opportunity to compete
for business and equal access to information. The incidence of regulation and taxation is assumed
to be neutral, impacting in a consistent way (Campbell 1981, 522). The Campbell Inquiry argued
that state-owned institutions should be evaluated to ensure that they were ‘filling a market gap in
the most cost-effective way’ in a changing financial environment. Government institutions should
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be economically viable, operationally efficient and not cause market inefficiencies or distortions.
If these conditions were not met, consideration should be given to their sale (Campbell 1981,
802). Once the Campbell Report’s other recommendations had been implemented, especially
those concerning the competitive structure of banking, there would cease to be justification on
efficiency grounds for continued government ownership of banks. It was accepted, however, that
governments for various reasons may wish to continue to own and operate these institutions
(Campbell 1981, 803). While privatisation was foreshadowed in the Campbell Report, the federal
government, who had no rights of ownership over State-run institutions, was not in a position
to act. This issue was a reflection of the longstanding demarcation between Federal and State
responsibilities. The issues associated with States’ rights in respect to state run enterprises were
not easily resolved in the financial or other industry sectors that had traditionally been the respon-
sibility of the various States. A consensus between the State and Federal governments supporting
privatisation did not emerge until the 1990s.
The privatisation of publicly-owned financial institutions commenced largely before microe-
conomic reform was articulated as a coherent programme with the release of the National
Competition Policy Review (Hilmer 1993). The Hilmer Report argued that most systematic dis-
tortions to competitive neutrality arose when government businesses participated in competitive
markets. Government businesses were often seen as enjoying a unique set of competitive advan-
tages by virtue of their ownership, including exemption from tax (Hilmer 1993, 293). The report
reinforced the argument that State-owned financial institutions such as banks and insurers should
operate in a competitively neutral environment. Where they did not, they should be subject to
reform (Hilmer 1993, 298). Concerns over competitive neutrality could be addressed in four main
ways: privatisation; corporatisation; reform of sources of advantage and disadvantage; and pricing
directions (Hilmer 1993, 300).
Analysis of the debate over the sale of government banks and insurers indicates that the propo-
nents of privatisation paid lip service to these arguments (Victoria, Hansard 1991, 1494). However,
examination of the circumstances and timing of sales indicates that motives other than efficiency
gains were driving the process (State Bank NSW 1990, 4). A second Financial System Inquiry
(Wallis 1997) suggested as much when it pointed to the series of financial crises associated with
government financial institutions which had occurred in the 1990s. It referred to the exit of gov-
ernment from ownership of financial institutions as ‘motivated by the desire of governments to
exit commercial businesses’ and ‘prompted by losses in certain state government-owned organ-
isations and the resultant burden on taxpayers’ (Wallis 1997, 131). The sequencing of policy
events indicated that privatisation in the financial services sector was not undertaken as part of a
concerted programme of policy implementation. Rather, it was an ad hoc consequence of events
arising in the financial markets and the economy at large.
Theoretical framework
There is a number of interpretative frameworks used to explain how the processes of industry
change and restructuring influence institutional ownership structures. Kane (1984) offers one
explanation for the adaptation of financial institutions to the changing environment in which
they operate. Kane (1984, 760–3) argues that the fusion of financial institutions confirms the
contestable markets hypothesis, which suggests that market structures adapt to promote the growth
of economically efficient service providers. Technological developments create the potential for
firms to reap economies of scope and this provides the incentive for financial institutions to move
into other related markets. According to this view, regulatory intervention may act to impede
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the process of adaptation by imposing avoidance costs on firms. The concept of the ‘regulatory
dialectic’ is used to explain how firms respond to their regulatory environment (Kane, 1981). The
implication of this type of analysis is that a reduction in the influence of government in the market,
say through the process of privatisation, will initiate further market restructuring.
An alternative line of argument adopts an information cost approach. Such an approach suggests
that the organisational structure chosen by the firm is determined by its response to information
costs (Casson 1997, 152). Information costs are a more generalised form of transaction cost
and refer to the costs associated with collection, processing and interpretation of data needed to
make strategic business decisions. Casson (1997, 151) distinguishes between transaction costs and
information costs by pointing out that the former are incurred because of opportunistic behaviour.
The latter occur whether or not opportunism and adverse selection influence the firm’s decision
making processes.
As information costs change, pressure is brought to bear on financial intermediaries to adapt.
Organisational renewal is seen as a regular process within this model. The model suggests that
factors which affect information costs lead to organisational change. Technological and regulatory
influences are two obvious factors affecting information costs. Evidence for changing information
costs can be seen in the manner in which technology has transformed the trading and delivery
of financial services. The result has been to erode barriers to entry and encourage the unbundling of
financial products and services (Llewellyn 1996, 155).
This paper considers the impact of a changing regulatory environment in the financial services
sector. The progressive lifting of controls, particularly in the banking sector, throughout the
1980s and 1990s allowed the market to re-adjust. What evolved in the long term was a multi-
staged process of adaptation which has affected the broader financial services sector, and had
implications for the organisational structures of financial service providers.
Two important influences on information costs are technological change and regulation. While
technological developments ultimately reduce information costs, regulation tends to impede the
flow of information and raise costs in this model. The lifting of controls, in freeing up the market
mechanism, alters the nature of information costs. The new and different competitive influences
that arise put pressure on the organisational structure of firms and markets. The lifting of regulatory
controls at a time of rapid technological innovation creates an environment in which organisational
change becomes inevitable. The demutualisation of major Australian life insurers in the 1990s is
an illustration of this. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, alterations to the regulation of building
societies with the Building Societies Act 1986 paved the way for the demutualisation of larger
building societies in the 1990s (Martin and Turner 2000, 225–7). The privatisation of government-
owned banks and insurers is another example of the adjustment process.
Features of government-owned financial institutions
An appreciation of the place of government-owned enterprises within banking and insurance
markets is necessary in developing an understanding of the outcomes of privatisation. As in
the UK market, there was an historical separation between commercial and household banking.
However, inAustralia it was government, both Federal and State, that historically assumed the main
responsibility for the provision of banking services to individuals and households. Governments
initially established State-owned banks and insurance offices to provide particular services to the
public. In the case of banks, the emphasis was on providing savings banking facilities. Insurance
offices were initially established to provide workers’compensation insurance and later compulsory
third party (motor accident) insurance.
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Government-owned banks
The division between retail and wholesale banking services was enshrined in the Banking Act
1945 that reinforced the distinction between savings banks and trading banks.2 Government-
owned savings banks had been established in the various colonies in the nineteenth century. The
underlying motivation was to encourage savings amongst the ‘industrious classes’. The provision
of services to business and the wealthier classes was left to the private sector. This distinction is
significant. State-owned banks came from a heritage of savings associations rather than commer-
cial institutions. They were similar in nature to British Post Office banks. Moreover, this system
also imposed geographic limitations on these banks as their spheres of influence were largely
constrained to the States in which they were established.
The bank crashes of the 1890s increased support for a government-owned national bank that
would provide the security to depositors which was lacking in the private sector (Merrett 2002a,
271). The Commonwealth Bank was established in 1912. The distinguishing feature of the Com-
monwealth Bank was that it had both trading bank and savings bank departments and it was
not restricted in its operation by State boundaries.3 The Commonwealth Bank savings function
operated in direct competition with the State banks and a number of mergers occurred between
these entities contributing to the growing market share of the Commonwealth. One of the key
catalysts for these mergers was a deterioration in the financial position of the various State banks.
The amalgamations with the State Bank NSW, State Bank WA and State Bank of Victoria fall into
this category. The other mergers resulted largely from competitive pressures and the strategies
adopted by early governors of the Commonwealth Bank (Wallace 1964, 238–43). Table 1 details
the mergers of government-owned banks.
Merger activity gave the Commonwealth Bank a virtual monopoly on savings bank deposits in
three States, allowing it to expand its activities into each State on the back of already established
facilities. In addition, as banker to the federal government, it benefited from the spin-offs associated
with government activities and the spread of the benefits payment system that led to an increase
in new savings accounts and deposits. The Commonwealth Bank rapidly grew to be the major
savings bank inAustralia. Until the 1950s, its major source of competition in the household savings
market was the remaining State banks and a limited number of non-bank financial institutions
which were also largely State-based (Wallace 1964, 245). In 1956 the first of the private trading
banks opened savings bank subsidiaries. However, it was not until the 1960s that the spread of
private savings banks occurred.
Competition between banks occurred within the confines of a regulated banking sector. In this
context, information costs were heavily influenced by the nature of regulation. This in turn affected
Table 1. Mergers of government-owned banks.
Year of merger with
State-owned bank Commonwealth Bank
State Savings Bank of Tasmania 1913
Queensland Government Savings Bank 1920
State Savings Bank WA 1931
Government Savings Bank of NSW 1931
State Bank of Victoria 1991
Source: Compiled from Wallace (1964, 238–43).
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the process of intermediation and organisational structure. Regulation of Australian banks placed
very rigid controls on the way they conducted their business. Regulation defined the boundaries
within which financial services firms could operate. Banks’ ability to operate in other financial
markets, such as insurance or credit finance, was restricted. This led them to set up subsidiary
arrangements in markets where direct activity was constrained. The competitive processes within
the finance sector were redirected. Regulation fixed the market share of existing banks and reduced
incentives for them to compete with each other (Lim andValentine 1985, 57–8). In addition, restric-
tions on entry protected existing firms from competitive market forces. The regulatory environment
provided little inducement for banks to react to changing global markets and technological forces.
Government-owned insurance offices
As with banks, government-owned insurance offices were established on a State-by-State basis
in the early decades of the twentieth century. The rationale for creating these offices was, by and
large, to provide for compulsory insurances created by State legislation. Workers’ compensation
legislation introduced by the various States was the initial driver, followed later by compulsory
third party insurance for motor vehicles (Pursell 1974, 213). Between 1914 and 1927, the six
States all established insurance offices. Unlike the banking sector, there was no national general
insurance supplier and the provision of government insurance products remained firmly embedded
in the State system until these offices were privatised in the 1990s.
A characteristic of insurance markets in Australia is that there are several distinct and differ-
entiated sub-markets determined by the classes of insurance provided. Understanding the place
of government insurers in these markets gives an indication of how and why these firms evolved
after privatisation. It is necessary in the first instance to differentiate between life and non-life
insurance. Life insurance has been, and continues to be, separated from the provision of non-
life insurance.4 Within the non-life insurance sector there are a number of classes of insurance,
including fire, general and marine insurance, motor vehicle, public liability, employee liability,
and compulsory third party insurance. While concentration in the insurance market as a whole has
been typically low, in the various sub-markets it has been much higher. Government insurance
providers enjoyed a degree of market power in compulsory insurance markets in their respective
States. By 1970 State insurers accounted for 59% of compulsory third party premiums and 24%
of workers’ compensation premiums. The proportion of total insurance premiums was around
20% (Pursell 1974, 218). With the exception of the Queensland government insurance office,
State participation in other forms of insurance was limited in scope. It was not until the 1980s
that State governments began actively to seek to expand these enterprises (Benjamin 1993, 239).
Government insurance offices were constrained in their ability to grow by the nature of the insur-
ance market and competitive forces within that market. Their major focus remained the provision
of compulsory insurance. Their ability to expand was also restricted by the geographic boundaries
imposed by State legislation. They were restrained in developing national markets for their prod-
ucts and so were limited in their ability to grow. Despite this, however, some insurance offices
were more aggressively competitive than others. The Queensland government insurance office, in
particular, developed a culture of market expansion from an early stage in its history. Soon after
its foundation, it branched into fire and life insurance, followed later by marine and motor vehicle
insurance (Thomis and Wales, 1986). Queensland was the only State in which the government
office succeeded in accounting for more than 25% of premium income across all types of non-life
insurance (Pursell 1974, 218). The Queensland office was also one of the first to adopt a strategy
of broadening its corporate base. In the 1970s it formed the SGIO Building Society as a result of
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a series of amalgamations of several Queensland building societies. In the 1980s it acquired the
Permanent Finance Corporation and along with it a major shareholding in the Bank of Queens-
land (Thomis and Wales 1986, 228–31). In adopting such a strategy, the Queensland government
insurance office was emulating the approach taken by other financial institutions in expanding its
sphere of influence. In doing so, it had begun to build a diversified base upon which a privatised
company could grow.
Deregulation of financial markets and its impact
The progressive lifting of regulatory controls in the financial services sector changed the envi-
ronment within which government-owned banking and insurance offices operated. Controls were
originally imposed for the purpose of macroeconomic management and were directed specifically
at the banking sector (Merrett 2002a, 277). Direct controls on interest rates and exchange rates
were abolished, captive market restrictions on financial institutions removed, and entry restric-
tions on foreign banks lifted (Davis 1997, 4). Prior to 1984, the number of foreign banks in
Australia was small. Only two operated continuously as authorised banks in the post-war period
(Edey and Gray 1996, 26).5 However, there were a number of foreign merchant banks operating
as non-bank financial institutions. Many of these converted to banks once entry requirements
were altered. Non-Australian firms in the general insurance sector, on the other hand, had a strong
influence. British firms, in particular, played a key role in the development of insurance markets
(Benjamin 1993). Conversely, Australian banks had a long history of operating overseas (Merrett
2002b). After deregulation, Australian banks increased their presence in overseas markets in a bid
to establish a global presence (Daugaard and Valentine 1997, 85–7). Australian general insurers,
however, were slow to develop their markets beyond the Australasia. Table 2 presents a summary
of the timing of reform in the Australian financial services sector.
Table 2. A summary of major reforms in the Australian financial services sector 1990–8.
Year Measures introduced
1980 Interest rate ceilings on most bank deposits lifted.
1981 Final report of the Australian Financial System Inquiry (Campbell Report).
1982 Maturity controls on bank deposits relaxed Lending restrictions on trading banks abolished.
Savings banks LGS requirements relaxed.
1983 Australian dollar floated Most exchange rate restrictions abolished.
1984 Banking licenses granted to foreign banks 30/20 rule imposed on life insurers abolished.
Interest prohibitions on cheque accounts abolished.
1985 Abolition LGS convention and introduction of Prime Assets Ratio Interest rate ceilings on
loans less than $100,000 lifted.
1986 Interest rate ceilings on housing loans lifted.
1988 BIS risk-weighted capital adequacy requirements introduced.
1991 Report of the Martin Inquiry into the Financial System.
1992 Restrictions on new bank entry lifted.
1997 Report of the Wallis Inquiry into the Financial System.
1998 Division of regulatory control between Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) responsible for
systemic stability, Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) responsible for
prudential control, Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) responsible
for market integrity.
Source: Davis (1999, 271).
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With the opening up of the financial services sector, barriers to entry and the segmentation of
markets were reduced. The industry reorganisation, that resulted from the lifting of restrictions,
led to the emergence of new institutions which no longer focused on the provision of one bundle
of products, transforming both information costs and risk in widened markets.
Deregulation initiated a period of restructure within the financial services sector. It did so
because the change in the institutional environment in which financial firms operated altered the
nature of information costs. Information costs were reduced as the legal requirements, determining
the manner in which financial institutions could operate, in differing financial markets, were
altered. Banks, for example, could now operate directly in insurance markets rather than through
subsidiary arrangements. Likewise building societies and life insurers could apply for banking
licences. Similarly it became possible for non-bank enterprises to compete with banks in the
provision of particular banking services (Llewllyn 1996, 158). In removing restrictions, firms
were better able to take advantage of the potential for economies of scope. Casson (1997, 155)
argues that competition between intermediaries tends to select in favour of those most successful
in minimising information costs. However there was an additional factor, which altered the manner
in which information costs affected intermediation and placed pressure on existing organisational
structures in the industry.
Concurrently with market adjustment inspired by deregulation, rapid technological develop-
ment in the production and distribution of financial services affected traditional providers of
banking and insurance products. Through the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, the provision of ser-
vices was revolutionised by advances in information processing. The outcome of this development
was to change the nature of information costs, which in turn placed pressure on the manner in which
business was traditionally done. Changes in information costs led to changes in intermediation
processes, resulting in pressure for organisational restructure. Table 3 explains how the process
evolved.
Harper (2000, 68) argues that financial intermediaries owe their existence to information asym-
metry in that its presence impedes the ability of markets to operate efficiently. The reduction in
information asymmetry resulting from the adoption of technological innovation has meant that
financial intermediaries are in more direct competition with financial markets. Financial insti-
tutions are forced to adapt to this shift. Those that do not adjust run the risk of failure and
insolvency. This line of argument not only explains the pressure on organisational structures but
the progressive rationalisation of the industry, which occurred through the 1990s.
Table 3. The impact of changing information costs.
Information costs⇒ Intermediation⇒ Organisational change
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Altered as deregulation and
technological innovation reduced
barriers to entry – increased
potential for economies of scope.
Evolved as regulatory and
technological changes impacted
on the finance market.
Sale and demutualisation of
traditional service providers in
particular markets.
⇓ ⇓ ⇓
Led to increased competition as
other large financial institutions
gained direct access to banking
and insurance markets.
Promoted the spread of
conglomerates and ‘allfinanz’
institutions.
Further adjustments within these
markets as newly privatised firms
react to competitive pressures –
mergers and acquisitions.
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In the lead up to government exit from banking and insurance markets, there were several
identifiable trends which have some bearing on the context and impact of the sale of these assets.
These trends were influenced both by the emerging financial environment after deregulation and
the spread of information technology. Four main trends were identified by the Reserve Bank of
Australia in its submission to the Financial System Inquiry of 1996. These were: changing market
share, product mobility, product diversity, and changes in the structure of financial firms (RBA
1996, 1–4).
Deregulation was associated with a change in the institutional structure of the financial system.
The extent of this shift is evident in Table 4. From Table 4, the shift in market share of various
financial intermediaries is evident. Banks gained a greater share of industry assets but this has
been at the expense of other types of deposit-taking institutions. Managed funds, particularly life
insurance and superannuation funds, increased their share of total assets. General insurance, on the
other hand, maintained a relatively static share of assets. Aggregates such as these can only give an
indication of the trends in industry adjustment. Underlying this data is a fundamental realignment
of the financial services sector. Part of the decline in the share of non-bank depository institutions,
for example, is explained by the conversion of a number of these firms to banks. Alterations to the
system of licensing banks allowed building societies the scope to apply for a banking licence after
1984. Two-thirds of building societies opted to become banks in this period. Further rationalisa-
tion occurred through merger activity as non-bank depository institutions were forced to compete
more openly with newly deregulated banks (Thomson and Abbott 1998, 88–9). The lifting of
interest rate restrictions on banks brought them into more direct competition with other providers
of personal finance. The relaxation of regulation was associated with an increase in the number
of foreign banks in the market (Davis 1997, 10; Edey and Gray 1996, 5–8). What is clear from
the information in Table 4 is that there was a change in the composition of the financial services
sector throughout the 1980s and early 1990s as deregulation was progressively introduced.
Associated with the shifting structure of the financial services sector was an increase in product
mobility and diversity. Deregulation allowed financial institutions to provide a greater and more
diversified range of products. For example, housing loans could be obtained from life insurance
companies or mortgage brokers. Life insurance companies were also supplying savings products
with very similar characteristics to bank term deposits (RBA 1996, 2). Technological and market
innovation provided the facilities for financial institutions to offer an increasing array of services to
the customer. New technology altered the way in which services could be provided to consumers,
electronic funds transfer being a case in point. This, in turn, allowed financial institutions to
differentiate between the products they provided and their various customer groups (Llewellyn
Table 4. Financial institutions per cent of total assets.
Institution 1979/80 1984/85 1989/90 1994/95
Reserve Bank 8.0 6.7 3.3 3.7
Banks 38.7 37.8 42.7 44.2
Non-Bank financial institutions 27.7 25.8 19.0 13.2
Life and super funds 17.2 18.0 20.7 25.5
Other managed funds 1.0 3.9 6.2 6.1
General insurers 5.9 5.9 4.3 5.4
Other financial institutions 1.6 1.9 3.7 1.9
Source: Collated from Davis (1997, 11).
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1996, 168). The unbundling or deconstruction of services into component parts opened the way for
financial firms to focus on the provision of services for which they had a comparative advantage
(Llewellyn 1996, 157).6 The result was not only to increase the range of financial products
but also to break down distinctions between financial firms and increase competition for the
customer’s dollar. These trends were not confined to theAustralian financial system. They mirrored
international trends in the growth and expansion of the financial services sector. In the United
Kingdom, for example, financial institutions such as life insurers were obtaining banking licences
and providing banking services, whilst financial products were also being provided by non-
financial firms (Llewellyn 1996, 153).
Realignment in the financial services sector in the 1990s was also associated with the rise
of conglomerates. A popular strategy adopted by both banks and non-bank financial institutions
wishing to expand into other markets was to acquire an interest or a subsidiary in that market.
Such trends were not new and had occurred in the 1950s and 1960s. Life insurers, for example,
diversified into general insurance, the short-term money market and consumer credit through sub-
sidiary arrangements at the time (Keneley 2004, 99). Trading banks also followed a similar pattern
of development (Runcie 1964, 165). At that time, however, the regulatory environment limited
the approach to and extent of organisational change (Keneley 2004, 96–100). The dismantling
of regulatory controls allowed the growth of financial conglomerates to proceed. The evolution of
the ‘allfinanz’ institution offering a full range of financial services gathered pace in the 1990s.
The Reserve Bank (1996, 3) reported that by 1996 conglomerates accounted for around 80% of
financial system assets. The largest 25 held close to 70% of assets.
The market pressures of the early 1990s provided a further impetus towards expansion and
diversification of operations globally. Financial institutions in Australia and elsewhere underwent
an accelerated process of restructuring. The trend both in Australia and overseas was for financial
firms to become larger, spreading into other financial markets in a bid to take advantage of
economies of scope and improve their competitive advantage (Rogers 1999, 5–8, 16–20). Similar
developments in Britain provided a catalyst for the demutualisation of major building societies. In
the space of six months in 1997, four of Britain’s largest building societies demutualised (Martin
and Turner 2000, 228).
Establishing the place of government-owned banks and insurers within this scenario explains
why privatisation became an imperative and why so few of these institutions have survived in their
original form. The sale of these assets may be seen as a necessary step in the process of structural
adjustment within the financial services sector. Table 5 summarises the position of government
institutions in theAustralian financial services sector just prior to the major period of privatisation,
which occurred between 1991 and 1997.
As mentioned previously, with the exception of the Commonwealth Bank, all government
institutions were State-based. While some operated in other States through agencies, the focus of
State-based banks and insurers was their state of origin. The extent to which this limited the ability
of these institutions to compete and expand in the emerging financial markets of the 1990s can
be gauged by considering the number and location of branches of government-owned banks, as
shown in Table 6. By comparison, their major competitors, the privately-owned domestic banks,
had branches in every State.
Government-owned insurers faced similar State-based geographic constraints. In 1980
government-owned insurers accounted for around one-third of total premium income in Australia.
However, this was not distributed evenly across the different types of insurance cover. Although
these insurers had extended their services into most types of insurance, they were only limited
players in these markets at a national level. The bulk of business done was still in workers’
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
6:
39
 2
0 
Ma
y 
20
10
Accounting, Business & Financial History 313
Table 5. The relative position of government-owned institutions in the banking and insurance sector 1990.
Sector Total assets $m 1990 % of market assets
All banks 325848
Commonwealth 66820 20.5
State Bank NSW 15326 4.7
State Bank SA 14038 4.3
R&I Bank WA 5954 1.8
State Bank of Victoria 19830 6.0
All general insurers 35472
Public sector insurers 14958 41.1*
*Average for six insurers. Data for individual insurers are not available.
Source: RBA Bulletin, Insurance and Superannuation Commission 1990.
Table 6. The number of branches of main banks in Australian states 1990.
New
South South Western Northern
Bank Wales Victoria Queensland Australia Australia Tasmania Territory ACT Total
Commonwealth 388 193 156 75 85 20 4 15 936
State Bank NSW 242 5 247
State Bank SA 2 176 4 182
R&I Bank WA 1 1 118 120
State Bank of 1 531 1 533
Victoria
ANZ 297 333 181 132 91 38 9 11 1,092
NAB 407 386 266 85 105 10 7 20 1,286
Westpac 472 306 229 95 138 34 9 18 1,301
Source: RBA Bulletin, September 1990, Table B15.
compensation insurance, where they accounted for 30% of premium income in 1980. In all other
markets, they earned less than 20% nationwide.7
The system of government ownership of financial institutions, which had emerged to fulfil
particular market needs early in the twentieth century, ill equipped these institutions to compete
in the deregulated environment of the last decades of that century. With the exception of the
Commonwealth Bank, all other government-owned banks and insurers were owned and controlled
by State governments. Their capacity to raise outside capital for expansion was limited, as was the
opportunity to trade beyond State boundaries. The Commonwealth Bank, whilst not restricted by
State boundaries, nevertheless had specific problems of its own that affected its ability to compete
in the new financial environment. Several studies investigating the performance of the Bank
found that it was inefficient and unprofitable when compared to private banks. Underperformance
was attributed to inefficient use of capital, over-staffing and less efficient workplace monitoring
(Otchere and Chan 2003, 952). The Commonwealth Bank was found to have lagged behind the
three major private banks in terms of efficiency, profitability and growth. This was a handicap,
which weakened the capacity of the bank to compete in a deregulated market environment.
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Pressure to compete and expand market share in the context of increasingly costly credit led
some government-owned institutions along a path to destruction. In the early 1990s, the banking
industry experienced a sharp decline in profitability. The sum of losses (before tax) amounted
to $9 billion or 2.25% of GDP (Gizycki and Lowe 2000, 181). Government-owned banks bore
the brunt of the profit downturn and several got into trouble as a result of aggressive and risky
lending policies. The two most publicised cases were the losses that accrued from the lending
activities of the State Bank ofVictoria and the State Bank of SouthAustralia. The underlying cause
of the problem was increased competition inspired by deregulation. In respect to the State Bank of
Victoria, the full acquisition of the Tricontinental Group in 1985 allowed for greater diversification
into other financial markets, such as merchant banking. However, it also exposed the Bank to the
risks associated with these markets. The stock market collapse of 1987 revealed the extent of
this risk. The desire for banks to expand their balance sheets led to the expansion of credit
secured by inflated asset prices (Gizycki and Lowe 2000, 183). Losses mounted as the economy
slowed and the speculative bubble burst. Tricontinental’s lending activities led the State Bank of
Victoria into debt. The losses accrued by Tricontinental left the State Bank $3 billion in deficit.
This represented 3.5 times the value of its capital (Davis 2004: Appendix 4.2; Royal Commission
1991, 1.4). Amidst a climate of uncertainty, which intensified with the collapse of a major regional
building society in the State and fears of a run on the State Bank, the decision was made to sell it
to the Commonwealth Bank in late 1990 (Murray and White 1992, 449).8
The State Bank of South Australia suffered a similar fate. With reconstitution of the Bank in
1984, a more aggressive approach to lending was adopted in a bid to capture market share.9 In
the aftermath of boom of the mid 1980s, the Bank was found to have made loans that were too
big, too concentrated in the property market and with low security-to-loans ratios (The Age, 11
February 1991). The Bank was reported to have lost $3.3 billion (Davis 2004: Appendix 4.2). The
financial collapse of the bank imposed heavy losses on the South Australian government leading
to political turmoil and the resignation of the State’s premier. The remains of the State Bank of
South Australia were acquired by the Advance Bank in 1992. Other banks such as the Rural and
Industries Bank in Western Australia also ran into trouble in 1991 but unlike the State banks of
Victoria and South Australia, it survived the experience (Newby 1994, 17).
These examples serve to illustrate the problematic nature of State banking at a time when the
full implications of financial deregulation were beginning to affect managerial and organisational
structures. The Reserve Bank of Australia identified increased competition and greater pressure
on banks’ management to make risk assessment decisions in a rapidly changing commercial
environment as particular consequences of deregulation (Royal Commission 1992, 54). State-
owned institutions were required to compete in a new and rapidly evolving market, which was very
different from the safe but controlled environment they were used to. The Australian experience
reflects that in other countries which also embarked on the process of deregulating aspects of their
financial services sectors. The property market bubble which burst in the United Kingdom soon
after the deregulation of its building society sector caught these institutions off guard in much the
same way as the State banks in Australia (Barnes 1992, 28–9). The crisis in the American Savings
and Loans industry is another example of the way in which competitive pressures post-deregulation
resulted in financial disruption (Barnes and Ward 1999, 213–15).
The privatisation and post-privatisation experience
The experience of privatisation in the Australian financial services sector indicates a dynamic
process of adaptation and change. Similar trends were evident in other countries where changes
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in the organisational structure of financial firms had occurred. British Building Societies are a case
in point. After the wave of demutualisation in the mid-1990s, there was a further round of exits
and takeovers. The National and Provincial was taken over by Abbey National, the Cheltenham
and Gloucester by Lloyds-TSB and the Bristol and West was acquired by the Bank of Ireland
(Martin and Turner 2000, 228).
In Australia, in most cases, the sale of the government institution was followed fairly rapidly
by further change in ownership or the restructure of the new enterprise. The information costs
model provides an explanation of why this occurred. Changes in traditional methods of conducting
business brought about by technological advance created an environment in which organisational
structures were evolving. This was taking place over the same period that government-owned
institutions were being sold off.
The sale of government-owned banks and insurance offices began in September 1991 when the
first tranche of shares in the Commonwealth Bank was offered to the public. Table 7 summarises
the details of the privatisation of government banks and insurers.10
The majority of institutions was sold to other companies, with only three being publicly floated.
In the case of the Commonwealth Bank, four tranches of shares were offered to the public over
a six-year period. The fate of these newly privatised enterprises is also outlined in Table 7. It is
significant that only two have survived in their original form. The others have disappeared through
merger and acquisition. Table 7 reveals something of the nature of the problems which State-based
institutions faced in the competitive environment. To compete at a national level, it was necessary
to expand market share in each State. This required either the establishment of new offices in
States where the company had not previously operated, or the acquisition of such infrastructure,
or the development of strategic alliances with related companies. At the same time, other financial
institutions were looking to expand in a similar manner. The newly privatised enterprises were
both predators and prey in this competitive environment.
Analysis of the operational history of privatised entities and the firms that acquired them gives
an insight into why some enterprises survived in the competitive market and others did not.
Given the limited extent of the Australian experience, it is not possible to draw conclusions as to
whether the method of sale (float/trade sale) had any substantial impact on the outcomes. Table 8
indicates the relationship between the sale price and the assets of privatised institutions. There
is no consistent pattern in these data, although it does appear that insurance institutions have a
higher price-to-asset ratio than banks. It does not provide any indication of the direction of the
future profitability of the firm.
The main method of sale adopted by Australian governments was the trade sale. Between 1991
and 1997, 62 of the 74 government enterprises sold were through this method of sale (RBA 1997,
14–6). The rationale for this was the belief that the processes of raising productivity and prof-
itability were enhanced. It was assumed that the purchaser would have particular experience and
expertise in managing similar businesses (RBA 1997, 10). Perversely, those privatised financial
firms that survived the initial post-privatisation period were those that were publicly floated. While
the most successful appear to be those in which public share offerings were made, this cannot be
said to be a necessary condition. A deeper analysis suggests that it was the corporate approach,
strategies and performance of firms in the lead up to privatisation that had a significant bearing on
their ability to compete. In the case of both Suncorp and the CBA, there had been a culture of com-
petition within the organisation. Suncorp was one of the few government insurers that pursued a
strategy of competing with private insurers from an early date. During the 1970s and 1980s, it had
diversified into related markets acquiring interests in building societies and finance companies. In
the lead up to privatisation, this strategy was continued. The acquisition of the Metway Bank gave
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Table 7. The privatisation of government-owned banks and insurers.
Institution Year established Year sold Type of sale Price $m Initial outcome Further outcome
Commonwealth Bank 1912 1991–97 Float 8,138 Listed as Commonwealth Bank
Australia
Continues to trade as such
State Bank SA 1984 1992 Trade Sale 730 Acquired by the Advance Bank Advance Bank acquired by the
St George Bank 1996. Delisted
13/5/1997
NSW GIO 1927 1992 Float 1,260 Listed as GIO Ltd and registered
as a general insurer
Acquired by AMP in 1998 in a
hostile takeover. Sold to Suncorp
in 2001
SIO Victoria 1914 1992 Trade Sale 125 Acquired by the GIO Acquired by Suncorp. Delisted
19/1/2000
SGIO WA 1926 1993 Float 165 Became SGIO Insurance and
registered as a general insurer
Acquired by NRMA in 1998.
State Bank NSW 1933 1994 Trade Sale 574 Acquired by Colonial Mutual and
became Colonial State Bank
Colonial acquired by the
Commonwealth Bank in 2000.
Delisted 6/7/2000
R&I Bank WA 1895 1995 Trade Sale 900 Acquired by the Bank of Scotland
which offered 49% as public
shares
Halifax acquired Bank of
Scotland and all public shares in
BankWest in 2001.
TGIO 1919 1995 Trade Sale 53.5 Acquired by Fortis Australia Tasmanian business sold to the
GIO in 1998.
SGIC SA 1924 1996 Trade Sale 175 Sold to Legal and General and
SGIO insurance. L&G acquired
the life and superannuation
business, SGIO the general and
health insurance business
Legal and General acquired by
Colonial; SGIO acquired by
NRMA (later IAG) in 1998.
Delisted 25/1/2000
Suncorp Qld 1916 1997 Float 1,950 Listed as Suncorp-Metway Ltd Continues to trade as such
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Table 8. Ratio of sale price to assets of privatised entities.
Institution Year sold Assets at time of sale $m Sale price $m Per cent, price/assets
Commonwealth Bank 1991–97 89292 8138 9.1
State Bank SA 1992 13899 730 5.3
NSW GIO 1992 3916 1260 32.2
SIO Victoria 1992 596 125 2.5
SGIO WA 1993 415.5 165 39.7
State Bank NSW 1994 17831 574 3.2
R&I Bank WA 1995 8574 900 10.5
TGIO 1995 NA 53.5 –
SGIC SA 1996 1693 175 10.3
Suncorp Qld 1997 19908 1950 9.8
Source: Collated from RBA 1999, Annual reports GIO and RBA Bank Statistics.
it greater access to banking facilities both in Queensland and interstate. Likewise, the merger of
Suncorp with the Queensland Industry Development Corporation expanded its influence in the
commercial lending market. At the time of privatisation, Suncorp had a presence in a variety
of financial markets. It built on this structure post privatisation, extending into newly emerging
markets, such as mortgage securitisation, as well as consolidating its assets in retail and business
banking and insurance.
The Commonwealth Bank also went through a restructuring process in the 1980s, which allowed
it to implement a strategy of expansion and development in both products and markets. In 1980 the
range of products available to customers was fairly limited, and related investment services were
offered through the Bank’s subsidiary companies specialising in finance and merchant banking.
At the same time, it was able to benefit from its large share of retail business nationally. By 1990
the range of services available to households had more than doubled. Dealings in related markets
had expanded and the Bank had established subsidiaries in life insurance and superannuation as
well as funds management (CBA 1991, 47). In the case of the CBA, its size and presence in all
States was also a significant factor in its success.
Both companies that successfully negotiated the privatisation process had established a diver-
sified business network prior to sale and were well positioned to compete in major financial
markets. Apart from the restrictions imposed by the geographic limitations of government-owned
banks and insurers, there are no common characteristics associated with those companies that did
not survive the adjustment process. Several identifiable factors, however, may have influenced
the outcome. Both Colonial, which acquired the State Bank of NSW, and Advance Bank, which
acquired the State Bank of South Australia, had recent history as mutual associations.11 Mutual
associations were limited in their ability to raise the necessary capital for expansion. This was one
of the major triggers for the wave of demutualisation that occurred in the 1990s. Upon demutual-
isation, firms went through a period of transition and experienced erratic performance (Keneley
2002, 78). This occurred at the time the NSW State Bank was acquired by Colonial. The former
mutual structure may have made these companies vulnerable but it was the wave of merger activity
in the banking sector in the mid 1990s that accounted for their demise. Merger activity increased
as competition intensified in response to changing forms of intermediation. Similar trends were
evident in the British building society sector. Mergers had been common amongst British build-
ing societies throughout the twentieth century. However, while early takeovers were driven by
the desire to expand and broaden markets, those that followed the wave of demutualisation in the
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1990s were associated with consolidation as firms reacted to the new competitive environment
(Stephens 2001, 344).
The Government Insurance Office (GIO) in NSW and the State Government Insurance Office
(SGIO) in Western Australia were privatised through the issue of shares to the public. After an
initial period of success, these companies fell victim to takeover bids. Within six years of listing
on the Australian stock exchange they had been absorbed by other insurers. The common charac-
teristic of these companies was that their core business market had been restricted historically by
State boundaries. Like Suncorp, these firms pursued a strategy of diversification prior to privati-
sation. However, they were not in as strong a position when privatisation occurred. The GIO, for
example, had developed a group structure, which incorporated financial and asset management
services (GIO 1990). However, exposure in other States apart from NSW was being built up from
a very limited base. While the process of building customer bases in other States began before
privatisation, it was in the years immediately after that the push to expand gained momentum.
This occurred at a time when the underwriting performance of the general insurance sector was
volatile. Underwriting losses had been experienced over a number of years during the 1990s
(APRA 1996–2000). Competitive pressures were identified as a factor contributing to losses and
were a major issue for firms such as the GIO in this market (GIO 1995). Losses experienced in
the general insurance market made these firms susceptible at a time of significant outlay in an
effort to build market share.
The Tasmanian Government Insurance Office (TGIO) and BankWest were the only two pri-
vatised entities to be acquired by majority overseas interests. In both cases, it was international
considerations that led to their further sale or merger. TGIO was sold to Fortis Australia, a sub-
sidiary of Fortis, the Dutch banking and insurance company. The Tasmanian insurance business
was sold in 1998 to GIO Limited as a result of a company restructure leading to a greater emphasis
on the Fortis’European business. BankWest became part of HBOS after the merger of Halifax with
the Bank of Scotland in 2001. The new company acquired all publicly listed shares in BankWest
after that date. In the case of the TGIO and BankWest, it was merger activity in the European and
Scottish financial markets rather than local restructuring pressures that initiated further changes
in ownership.
The post-privatisation history of government-owned banks and insurance companies illustrates
the dynamic nature of the process of organisational change within the financial services sector. This
process, driven by the need to adapt to the changing nature of information costs in a deregulated
market undergoing rapid technological change, was the overriding influence on the outcome of
the sale of government-owned assets in this sector.
Conclusion
Deregulation of the Australian financial services sector over the past two decades initiated a
process of structural and organisational change. The privatisation of government-owned financial
institutions in the 1990s was an important and inevitable part of this development. Using an
information costs framework, it is possible to explain the outcome of this change. This theoretical
framework suggests that factors that affect information costs will lead to organisational change.
The two most significant factors affecting information costs in the banking and insurance sectors
were technological innovation and changes to regulation. While technological change reduced
information costs, regulatory controls impeded the response by government-owned institutions to
this trend. The process of deregulation in reducing barriers to entry altered the manner in which
information costs affect financial markets. The concurrent advances in information processing
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
6:
39
 2
0 
Ma
y 
20
10
Accounting, Business & Financial History 319
and marketing of financial products changed the nature of information costs. The result was the
transformation of financial markets and the emergence of new financial institutions offering a
diverse range of products to consumers. A characteristic of this process was the pressure on
merger and acquisition as financial firms sought to expand market share and reap the economies
of scope made possible by technological innovation. It was within this context that State and
federal governments embarked on a process of privatisation.
The position of government-owned banks and insurers prior to privatisation had an important
bearing on the outcome of the process. With one exception these institutions had been limited in
their ability to develop and grow market share in their core business by the geographic limits of their
respective regulatory jurisdictions.With a few exceptions, they were slow to move into new product
markets and develop a competitive culture. A characteristic of the most successful privatised firms
was that they had effectively pursued a strategy of diversification prior to privatisation. Those firms
that were not able to establish market share in related financial markets prior to privatisation battled
to do so in the financial climate of the mid 1990s. Privatised banks and insurers were by and large
ill equipped to compete with the changing nature of financial intermediation and its implications
for the organisational structure of financial markets. Acquisition and takeover was an inevitable
result as these markets continued the restructuring process.
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Notes
1. For an examination of the circumstances surrounding the report see Fitzgibbon (2006).
2. This division was not altered until 1989 when amendments to the Banking Act eliminated the distinction.
3. The savings bank function of the Commonwealth Bank was given a more formal status when the Commonwealth
Savings Bank was created in 1928.
4. This distinction has a legal basis in the Life Insurance Act 1945 which requires that life insurance assets be held in
separate statutory funds to other insurance business and that life insurers be registered.
5. These were the Bank of New Zealand and the Banque de Nationale de Paris.
6. An example of this is the growth of mortgage companies focusing on the provision of housing finance to individuals
and households.
7. Camilleri (1986) provides the data upon which these proportions are derived.
8. The Pyramid Building Society collapsed in June 1990.
9. The State Bank of South Australia was formed in 1984 after the merger of the Savings Bank of South Australia and
the State Bank of South Australia. The original State Bank had been formed in 1896.
10. The State Bank of Victoria was not included in this table as it was acquired by the Commonwealth Bank prior to the
sale of the latter.
11. Colonial was formed with the demutualisation of the Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society in 1996. The Advance
Bank was the product of the demutualisation of the NSW Permanent Building Society in 1985.
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